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ABSTRACT 
This research paper considers the role of judicial review in employment and in 
particular the availability of judicial review to challenge employer decisions in the 
Employment Court. It does this by looking at two broad issues: the nature of the 
Employment Court's judicial review jurisdiction including their approach to it, and 
the appropriate scope of judicial review of employment related issues. 
An analysis of the nature of the Court's jurisdiction raise two main concerns. First, 
that while the Employment Contracts Act 1991 (ECA) confers "full and exclusive" 
jurisdiction on the Employment Court over judicial review the jurisdiction is 
nonetheless limited because it only relates to statutory powers exercised under the 
State Sector Act 1988 and the ECA itself. The second concern is that the 
Employment Court have fundamentally misunderstood the approach they should be 
taking to judicial review under the jurisdiction conferred on them. 
The next chapter considers what approach the Employment Court should take. In 
considering this question it places the scope of judicial review of employment 
related decisions both in the context of developments in judicial review and of 
changes to the nature of public employment. In that context, the paper identifies 
the "private" nature of employment as an activity as underlying the problems faced 
by Courts in formulating a logical and coherent approach to the scope of judicial 
review in employment. 
In looking at both these areas, the impact of the recent Privy Council decision in 
Mercury Energy v Electricity Corporation of New Zealand [1994] 1 WLR 521 is 
examined. 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes and bibliography) 
comprises approximately 14,900 words. 
LAW LIBRARY 
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INTRODUCTION 
Some of the most famous administrative law cases involve judicial review of 
employment related decisions. Ridge v Baldwin, 1 often referred to as heralding the 
beginning of the modern approach to judicial review,2 concerned the termination of 
employment of a police officer. So too did the case of Chief Constable of the North 
Wales Police v Evans ,3 in which Lord Brightman set out the often quoted 
distinction between appeal and review. 4 And, it was another employment case, 
Council for Civil Service Unions (CCSU) v Minister for the Civil Service, 5 this 
time involving spies , in which Lord Diplock set out what he called the three main 
grounds for judicial review, illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety. 6 It 
was also in this case that Lord Diplock, with others, argued that it was the nature 
and not the source of the power that was important in determining whether or not a 
particular administrative decision was susceptible to review. 7 
That these are landmark cases is perhaps a demonstration of the problem there has 
been in determining the scope of judicial review as an avenue for challenging 
employment related decisions of public bodies. Central to the Courts' difficulties is 
that employment has never been an activity limited to the public sector. These 
difficulties have been compounded by changes to the nature of public employment. 
2 
6 
[1964] AC 40. 
See for example M Freedland "The emerging law of public employment" (1990) 19 ILl 
199, where he said "The problem of the application of public law to public employment 
had been posed at the very birth of modern administrative law when the House of Lords 
decided the case of Ridge v Baldwin. See also GDS Taylor Judicial Review (Butterworths, 
Wellington, 1991) 4. 
[1982] WLR 1155. 
Lord Brightman said that unlike an appeal judicial review was not concerned with the 
decision but the decision making process. See above n 3, 1173 F and 1174 G. 
CCSU v Minister for the Civil Service [1984] 3 All ER 935. 
Above o 5, 950. 
Above n 5, 949-950 per Lord Diplock; 948 per Lord Scarman; 956 per Lord Roskill. 
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In many ways it is a misnomer to talk about public employment as if this were a 
homogenous concept. As far back as last century there were significant differences 
between the way in which employment relationships of different groups of workers 
in the state sector were regulated. 8 These differences have been magnified over the 
last decade as a result of enormous changes to the nature and operation of the state 
sector. 9 The transformation of various state trading activities into State Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs) in 1986, many of which have subsequently been privatised is 
just one example. In addition to SOEs there are now literally dozens of crown 
entities, bodies established and generally funded by government. The 
organisational form of these bodies varies. Some, such as Crown Research 
Institutes and Crown Health Enterprises are incorporated companies. Others such 
as Boards of Trustees of primary and secondary schools are not. 
The local authority sector has undergone a similar restructuring. For example, 
harbour boards have been replaced by port companies, electricity supply authorities 
have been privatised, and many traditional local authority services such as public 
transport and rubbish collection have been contracted out. 
While local authorities' staff have traditionally been covered by private sector 
industrial relations laws, state sector employees were, until the passage of the State 
Sector Act 1988, covered by quite separate arrangements. The change to the nature 
of the public sector along with the erosion of the institutional distinction between 
public and private employment further exacerbates the difficulty of deciding when 
judicial review will be an appropriate mechanism to challenge employment 
decisions. 
This paper concentrates on two broad issues which are dealt with in separate 
chapters. The first chapter concerns the nature of the judicial review jurisdiction 
8 
9 
For example railway employees were covered by the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration 
Act 1894, whereas other servants were not. 
For a description of the shape of the current public sector see J Boston et al Public 
Management: the New 'Zealand Model (OUP, AuckJand, 1996) 58-67. 
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conferred on the Employment Court by section 105 of the Employment Contracts 
Act 1991 (ECA). The paper outlines the scope of that jurisdiction and argues it 
should be expanded so that the Court has jurisdiction over all judicial review cases 
concerning employment. 
The paper then considers the approach taken by the Employment Court to that 
jurisdiction and argues that the approach of the Court is fundamentally flawed. The 
paper suggests that the Court does not recognise that section 105 is not the 
determinant of when judicial review will be available, but merely the determinant 
of when the Employment Court rather than the High Court will have jurisdiction to 
hear an application. Instead the Court approaches the section as though it confers a 
substantive right to judicial review, using the concept of statutory power to limit its 
availability in what it considers inappropriate cases. It is argued that not only does 
this lead to inconsistencies in the Court's treatment of the issues of what constitutes 
a statutory power but, in light of the Privy Council decision in Mercury Energy Ltd 
v Electricity Corporation of New Zealand, 10 the approach of the Court to the issue 
of statutory powers is wrong. The paper concludes that the real test of the 
availability of judicial review is not the issue of statutory power but the question of 
whether or not there has been an exercise of a public law power. ---
How a court should approach the scope of judicial review in employment is the 
subject of the next chapter. First, it considers the impact of the Mercury decision 
on this scope and suggests that Mercury leaves open the issue of whether or not 
employment decisions of public bodies will always be susceptible to judicial 
review. 
The paper then goes on to consider when judicial review should be available. It 
does this by analysing the approach of English courts and the concerns that 
underlie that approach. While concluding that the Employment Court, in 
10 [1994] 1 WLR 521. 
/ 
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formulating its approach to the exercise of public law powers in an employment 
context, should not follow in the footsteps of their English colleagues, nonetheless 
the paper acknowledges that the issue is a complex one. The reason for the 
complexity is the tension that exists between the "private" nature of employment as 
an activity and the importance of ensuring that public bodies act properly. The 
more a public body resembles a private employer the more difficult it is to 
determine on what basis employment decisions should be subject to review. 
In the end the paper argues that the policy arguments in favour of setting proper 
public standards outweighs the anomalies this would create between public and 
private sector workers and employers. It also says that the anomalies are lessened 
because of the incorporation of public law principles in the law relating to personal 
grievances and discusses whether there is any likelihood that the Court might 
expand its private law supervision of employment related decisions. 
The last section looks at the the issue of judicial restraint. It argues that contrary to -, 
the interpretation of this issue in Mercury by some courts and commentators, the 
decision in Mercury does not, with respect to commercial decisions, limit the 
availability of judicial review to instances in which there has been fraud, corruption 
or bad faith. The limitations only applied where judicial review is being sought on 
grounds of unreasonableness. The paper goes on to discuss the issue of judicial J 
restraint in an employment context focussing in particular on the issue of collective 
bargaining. While acknowledging this as an area in which judicial restraint may 
well be appropriate, the paper nonetheless makes suggestions as to when judicial 
review may be available. Lastly the chapter argues that when courts are 
considering whether or not to exercise restraint they should take into account that 
employment contracts and employment relationships are different from ordinary 
commercial contracts and commercial dealings. 
8 
The paper concludes by questioning Goddard CJ's comment that section 105 of the 
ECA requires a specialist adaptation of the principles of administrative law. 11 
Instead, the paper suggests that a better understanding of adminstrative law is what 
is really needed. 
II Griffin and Teld v Attorney-General [ 1995] 1 ERNZ 119, 140. 
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II SECTION 105: THE JURISDICTION AND 
APPROACHOFTHEEMPLOYMENTCOURT 
A The Jurisdiction of the Employment Court 
1 The Scope 
Jurisdiction to hear applications for judicial review first passed to a specialist 
employment court under the Labour Relations Act 1987. 12 This jurisdiction 
continues under the ECA, section 105(1) of which states: 
[I]f any person wishes to apply for review under Part I of the Judicature Amendment Act 
1972, or bring proceedings seeking a writ or order of, or in the nature or mandamus, 
prohibition, or certiorari, or a declaration or injunction in relation to the exercise, refusal 
to exercise, or proposed or purported exercise by -
(a) The Tribunal ; or 
(b) An officer of the Tribunal or Court; or 
(c) An employer, or that employer' s representative under this Act; or 
(d) An employee, or that employee's representative under this Act -
of a statutory power or statutory power of decision (as defined by section 3 of the 
Judicature Amendment Act 1972) conferred by or under this Act or the State Sector Act 
1988, the provisions of subsections (2) to ( 4) of this section apply. 
Subsection (2) gives the Employment Court full and exclusive jurisdiction to hear 
any application for review or any proceedings of the type mentioned in subsection 
(1). Subsection (3) states that where a right of appeal is conferred under either the 
ECA or State Sector Act, the appeal must first be exercised before any application 
for review can be made. Subsection (4) confers on the Employment Court judges 
the ability to make procedural directions in such cases. 
12 Section 280. 
10 
The judicial review jurisdiction conferred by the ECA differs from that conferred 
by the Labour Relations Act in two main ways. The first simply reflects the 
difference in the two regimes. For example, reference to the Registrar of Unions 
has been removed because trade unions are no longer required or able register in 
return for representation rights. The second change represents a strengthening m 
the jurisdiction of the Employment Court under the Act. 
Section 105(2) gives the Employment Court "full and exclusive jurisdiction" in 
judicial review proceedings covered by the Act. This change was made because 
there was uncertainty as to whether, under the provision in the Labour Relations 
Act, the High Court retained a residual jurisdiction. In Elgin v Newman 13 Greig J 
said that jurisdiction may also still lie with the High Court because the Labour 
Relations Act conferred "full and exclusive jurisdiction" in some proceedings but 
in respect of judicial review, simply stated that proceedings "shall be made or 
brought to the Labour Court." While the new wording under the ECA is probably 
sufficient to ensure jurisdictional exclusivity for the Employment Court, there is 
still one potential problem given the reasoning of Greig J. Sections 73 and 74 of 
the ECA, which relate to proceedings in relation to certain torts and for injunctions 
in strike and lockout situations, go further than just conferring "full and exclusive 
jurisdiction" on the Court. They also state that no other court shall have 
jurisdiction to hear these proceedings. 14 The question therefore arises, does the 
failure to state, with respect to judicial review, that no other court has jurisdiction 
mean that they do? Whether the difference in wording, between sections 73 and 74 
on the one hand and section 105 on the other, will be interpreted as leaving a 
residual jurisdiction in the High Court remains to be seen. In practice it may never 
be a real issue given the Court of Appeal decision in NZ Couriers Ltd v Curtin. 15 
13 
14 
15 
[1989] NZILR 609. 
Sections 73(2) and 7 4(2). 
[1992] 2 ERNZ 541. 
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In this case the Court made it clear that where general and specialist courts both 
have jurisdiction, the matter should be heard in the specialist court unless 
persuasive considerations or policy suggest otherwise. 
Even if the "full and exclusive jurisdiction" provisions of section 105 were held to 
confer exactly that, there remain serious limits on the scope of this jurisdiction. 
The jurisdiction under section 105 applies only in respect of statutory powers or 
statutory powers of decision conferred by or under either the State Sector Act or 
the ECA itself. The Court does not have jurisdiction in respect of employment 
related matters where the source of the power is non-statutory. And, with the 
exception of powers under the Pol ice Act 195 8, 16 nor does it have jurisdiction 
where the power is conferred under other legislation, such as the Local 
Government Act 1974. 
In Northern Local Government Officers Union v Auckland City11 Rodney Harrison 
QC tried to persuade the Employment Court to adopt a liberal interpretation of its 
own judicial review jurisdiction. He argued that the Employment Court had 
jurisdiction to hear the application for judicial review even if the employer was 
exercising powers under the Local Government Act 1974. His first argument was 
that such an approach was in line with the "well established principle" that where 
serious issues of labour law arise, the High Court (which undoubtedly had 
jurisdiction) should defer to the specialist jurisdiction of the Employment Court. 
His second argument was that the Court had jurisdiction under section 104(l)(g). 
This provision gives the Employment Court jurisdiction "[t]o hear and determine 
any action founded on an employment contract." The application for review before 
the Court was, Harrison claimed, founded on an employment contract. 
16 
17 
Section 96. 
[1992] 1 ERNZ 1109. 
12 
The Court was not persuaded. In a decision of the full Court, Goddard CJ 
suggested that the omission of any reference to Acts such as the State Owned 
Enterprises Act or Local Government Act was probably unintended and likely to be 
short lived. Nonetheless, in light of the specific reference only to the State Sector 
and Employment Contracts Acts, he held that it was not open to the Court, under 
section 105, to review the exercise of a statutory power conferred by the Local 
Government Act 1974. 18 Goddard CJ also dismissed Harrison's second argument, 
holding that no jurisdiction lay under section 104 either: 19 
It is only necessary to recall the references in sl05(1) to such remedies as mandamus, 
prohibition and certiorari and the definition of what is an application for review contained 
in s 4 Judicature Amendment Act 1972 for it to become apparent that if the present 
application for review is founded on an employment contract or relates to an employment 
contract (sl04(l)(h)) that is purely coincidental and does not represent the true nature of 
the proceeding. 
2 A need for reform? 
Irrespective of whether the omission in section 105 was deliberate or unintentional, 
the scope of the jurisdiction as presently enacted lacks logic. Coherency could be 
achieved either through expanding the Employment Court's jurisdiction or 
removing it altogether. It might be argued that removing the judicial review 
jurisdiction does not interfere with the principle of deferring to the specialist 
expertise of the Court, since judicial review is primarily concerned with principles 
of administrative and not employment law. However there are very real advantages 
to the judicial review jurisdiction staying with the Employment Court. 
18 
19 
Above n 17, 1136-1137. 
Above n 17 1137. 
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The first advantage is that it stops various causes of action arising from the same 
dispute from having to be pleaded in separate courts. Not only are separate 
pleadings both time consuming and costly, the divide between public and private 
law in employment is difficult to determine, as the analysis of the English decisions 
discussed in the next chapter shows. The English experience also highlights another 
"undesirable consequence" of a divided jurisdiction: it encourages what Deakin 
and Morris describe as opportunistic litigation. 20 An example of this is the 
approach taken by the Crown to the issue of whether civil servants have contracts 
of employment. In R v Civil Se,-vice Appeal Board ex parte Bruce, 21 the Crown 
argued that judicial review was inappropriate because the relationship was 
contractual. However, in McLaren v Home Offtcr the Crown took the opposing 
view, arguing that the matter could not be litigated in private law because there 
was no contract of employment. 
Dividing the jurisdiction would also limit remedial flexibility such as occurred in 
the case of Fahey v Attorney-General. 23 In Fahey the applicants sought judicial 
review of an appointment process. At a late stage in the judicial review 
proceedings, the relief sought was changed from a declaration to damages. The 
reason for this change was the adverse effect a declaration would have on the 
employment of the successful appointees who were currently in post. Although the 
ability to grant such relief in judicial review proceedings was questioned by the 
Crown, the Employment Court had no hesitation in doing so. Amongst the reasons 
why damages were held to be available was that separate damages actions could 
have been filed in conjunction with judicial review application; that the Court 
should facilitate rather than impede the plaintiffs obtaining all the remedies; and 
that rules of procedure should be the servant and not the master in the field of 
20 
21 
22 
23 
S Deakin and G Morris Labour Law (Butterworths, London, 1995) 377. 
[ 1988] ICR 649; [ 1989] ICR 171. 
[1989] ICR 550; [1990] ICR 824. 
Fahey vA-G [1993] 2 ERNZ 164. 
14 
dispensing justice. 24 Goddard CJ noted that the specialist Employment Court has a 
long tradition of adopting "a practical approach to the rules of procedure. "25 Were 
the Employment Court to lose its judicial review jurisdiction, the beneficial effects 
of this kind of remedial flexibility would be lost. Leaving the jurisdiction 
unchanged within its present limitations is also not ideal since not all workers have 
access to this remedial advantage. Local authority or health service employees, for 
example, will miss out, since the Employment Court does not have jurisdiction 
over the exercise of statutory powers under either the Local Government Act 1974 
or the Health and Disability Services Act 1993. 
B The Jurisdiction Misunderstood 
1 JAA procedural only 
The Judicature Amendment Act 1972 (JAA) was intended to eliminate the 
procedural difficulties associated with the traditional administrative law remedies. 
The Court described it thus in Re Royal Commission on the Thomas Case. 26 
The intention of the 1972 legislation was not to widen the grounds on which the Court 
could grant relief, but to extend the nature of the relief that could be granted once those 
grounds were established, and then to improve the procedure by which that relief could be 
obtained. 
Section 4(1) of the JAA provides: 
24 
26 
. . . the Court may by order grant, in relation to the exercise by any person of a statutory 
power. .. any relief that the applicant would be entitled to, in any one of more of the 
proceedings for a writ or order of or in the nature of mandamus, prohibition, or certiorari 
or for a declaration or injunction, against that person in any such proceedings. 
Above n 23, 191-198. 
Above n 23 , I 94. His comments were intended to refer illso to the l..Abour Court. 
[1980] 1 NZLR 602 , 616. 
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An application for review under the Act may be made provided the applicant would 
be entitled to relief in proceedings for a writ or order of mandamus , certiorari or 
prohibition, or would be entitled to an injunction or declaration against that person 
in any such proceedings. Key to the availability of review is that a remedy must 
first be available in public law.27 The JAA is merely procedural. An application for 
review can be made under that Act rather than under the High Court Rules if the 
matter relates to the exercise, or proposed or purported exercise of a statutory 
power. 
In 1977, there was a major amendment to the JAA. Amongst the changes was an 
amendment to the definition of statutory power. Included within the definition was 
powers or rights conferred "by or under the constitution or other instrument of 
incorporation, rules or bylaws of any body corporate. "28 While this amendment 
expanded the definition of statutory power, it was not intended to expand the 
situations in which a remedy would be available in public law. 29 
2 Jurisdiction misunderstood 
The Employment Court have misunderstood the nature of the Judicature 
Amendment Act. They have failed to appreciate that the JAA does not determine 
the scope of judicial review. 
The approach of the Employment Court to the JAA is clearly evidenced by a recent 
decision O'Neill v Wellington Free Ambulance Service Incorporated.30 In O'Neill it 
27 
28 
29 
30 
See Daemar v Gilliand [1979] 2 NZLR 7, 16; [1981] 1 NZLR 61 , 63-64. 
J AA section 3. 
Above n 27. 
Unreported, Employment Court , Wellington Registry , WEC 38/96, 2 July 1996. 
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was conceded that the decision in question fell within the definition of a statutory 
power of decision since it was a decision taken under the constitution of the 
incorporated society. Goddard CJ then said: 31 
[T]hat being so, the plaintiff has surmounted the first hurdle of showing that a jurisdiction 
in administrative law exists. The next hurdle that the plaintiff faced was to show that that 
jurisdiction in relation to employment matters had been transferred to this Court. 
The Chief Judge could not be more wrong. The first hurdle in showing that 
jurisdiction in administrative law exists is for there to have been the exercise of a 
public law power. This was made clear by Lord Diplock in CCSU when he said: 
[f]or a decision to be susceptible to judicial review the decision maker must be 
empowered by public law (and not merely, as in arbitration, by agreement between 
private parties)". 32 It is the existence of that power that is the touchstone to the 
availability of public law remedies. This view was reinforced in R v Take-over 
Panel ex parte Datafin33 where, in considering the various factors which had 
resulted in bodies being subjected to review, Sir John Donaldson MR said: 34 
it is a fatal error to regard the presence of all those factors as essential or as being exclusive 
of other factors. Possibly the only essential elements are what can be described as a public 
element, which can take many different forms, and the exclusion from the jurisdiction of 
bodies whose sole source of power is a consensual submission to its jurisdiction. 
To be fair to the Employment Court they are not alone in misunderstanding that the 
source of the power merely affects the procedure by which the remedy can be 
31 
32 
33 
34 
Above n 30, 8. 
Above n 5 949. 
[1987] 1 QB 815. 
Above n 33, 838. 
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sought. Graham Taylor in his book on judicial review seems to make the same 
mistake. He also fails to recognise the purely procedural nature of the JAA. 35 
The effect of the Employment Court' s approach is that they use the concept of 
statutory power as a gate by which the review jurisdiction is activated. The 
unsuitability of using the exercise of a statutory power as an automatic trigger for 
judicial review is illustrated by the inability of the Employment Court to formulate 
a consistent approach to the issue of what constitutes a statutory power. 
3 Statutory powers under the JAA 
Statutory power _is defined in the JAA as "a power or right conferred by or under 
any Act or by or under the constitution or other instrument of incorporation, rules 
or by laws of any body corporate" . 36 Two related issues arise in determining the 
nature of a statutory power under this definition. First, what is meant by a power 
or right and the second, what is meant by the phrase "conferred by or under". 
The approach to be taken in determining what constitutes a power or right was 
discussed by the Court of Appeal in Re Erebus Royal Commission (No 2). 31 It was 
held that a narrow concept of rights or of what affected rights was not in accord 
with the general purposes of the Act. Instead , the Court said that a "broad , realistic 
and somewhat flexible approach would enable the Act to work most effectively" .38 
Similarly , in Lemmington Holdings Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue,39 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
GDS Taylor Judicial Review (Butterworths, Wellington, 1991). See in particular paras 1.02 
and 1.06. 
Section 3. 
[1981] l NZLR 614. 
Above n 37, 627. 
[1984] 2 NZLR 214. 
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Eichelbaum J said the provisions should not be "read down ... so as in some way 
to limit the liberalising concepts embodied in it. "40 
The second issue, what is meant by the phrase "conferred by or under", requires 
that consideration be given to the proximity or nexus that must exist between the 
action or decision and the statutory provision. Michael Taggart describes the Privy 
Council decision in Mercury Energy Ltd v Electricity Corporation of New Zealand 
Ltd as resolving a decade-long difference of judicial opinion in New Zealand over 
the issue. 41 This difference of opinion was reflected in two Court of Appeal 
decisions. The first was the decision in Webster v Auckland Harbour B0arcf2 in 
which the Court held that it was sufficient for the decision maker to be acting 
under a general empowering provision. The other decision was New Zealand Stock 
Exchange v Listed Companies Association43 where the Court said that the particular 
power in question had to be statutorily conferred. When Mercury came before the 
Court of Appeal, the Court adopted the Stock Exchange line of reasoning. They 
held that "[t]o attract judicial review the impugned action must amount to the 
exercise of a particular statutory power. "44 By overturning their decision, Taggart 
argues that the Privy Council are by implication preferring the approach in the 
Webster case and those based on it. 45 
4 Employment Court view of statutory power 
The first comprehensive discussion by the Employment Court of what constitutes a 
statutory power or statutory power of decision occurred in the leading case of New 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
Above n 39, 221. 
M Taggart "Corporatisation, Contracting and the Courts" [1994] PL 351, 355. 
(1983) NZLR 646. 
[1984] 1 NZLR 699. 
Above n 43, 560. 
For example, New 'Zealand Optical Ltd v Telecom Corporation (1990) 5 NZCLC 66,457; 
Budget Rent a Car Ltd v Auckland Regional Authority [1985] 2 NZLR 414. 
__.J 
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Zealand Association of Inspectors in Schools and Education Officers & Ors v 
Minister of Education & Ors. 46 This case concerned the ability of, and consequent 
refusal by, the Director-General of Education, under the terms of a redundancy 
agreement registered under the Labour Relations Act, to recognise past teaching 
service for the purposes of calculating severance payments. The Association of 
Inspectors in Schools and various of its members sought judicial review of this 
refusal. 
Relying on the decision in the Stock Exchange case, the Director-General of 
Education argued that a public body is not amenable to judicial review when they 
are either exercising a contractual right or exercising a function merely because the 
power to exercise those rights or functions stems from statute. While the Labour 
Court acknowledged that not all acts of employers under the Labour Relations or 
State Sector Acts would be reviewable,47 Goddard CJ nonetheless rejected the idea 
that the exercise of a contractual power automatically ousted the administrative law 
jurisdiction of the Court. The Chief Judge clearly preferred the view of the Court 
of Appeal in Webster v Auckland Harbour Board where , in a joint judgment, 
Cooke and Jeffries JJ said: 48 
46 
47 
48 
The issues of invalidity and statutory power of decision are interconnected. They cannot 
satisfactorily , we think, be considered separately. Undoubtedly a public body which bas, as 
here , lawfully entered into a contract is bound by it and has the same powers under it as 
any other contracting party. But in exercising the contractual powers it may also be 
restricted by its public law responsibilities . The result may be that a decision taken by the 
public body cannot be treated as purely in the realm of contract; it may be at the same time 
a decision governed by some extent by statute. 
[ 1990 J 2 N ZILR 960. 
Above n 46, 994 . 
Above n 42, 650 . 
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Goddard CJ also said that the distinction made in the Stock Exchange case between 
powers and functions could give rise to confusion if it was extended into other 
contexts. He argued that it was used only as a way of describing the finding in that 
case that the Stock Exchange had not exercised a power conferred on it by statute 
or under its own constitution. It was not authority for saying that a public body is 
not exercising a statutory power merely because the decision was made in the 
course of the public body going about its statutory business. 49 The Stock Exchange 
decision, Goddard CJ said , should be limited to its own facts . 50 
The Court held in the School Inspectors case that the Director-General had been 
exercising a statutory power of decision, both because the agreement had been 
registered and therefore became secondary legislation and, because of the general 
statutory underpinning, through the State Sector Act, of public employment 
provisions . 51 In so finding , Goddard CJ said that the phrase "by or under" meant 
both direct and derivative powers or rights. 52 
This same approach was followed and expanded on in other decisions relating to 
powers under the State Sector Act. In Fahey, for example, a decision made under 
personnel management policies was held to be statutory power of decision because 
the State Sector Act required the promulgation of a personnel policy . Therefore the 
decision was indirectly authorised by that Act. 53 Similarly in Griffin and Teld v 
Attorney-General, Goddard CJ described a derivative power as one which owed its 
existence to an activity authorised or underpinned by the Act. 54 
49 Above n 46, 994. 
50 Above n 46, 994. 
51 Above n 46, 996. 
52 Above n 46, 996. 
53 Above n 23, 188. 
54 Above n 11 , 141. 
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5 Approach inconsistent 
While statutory underpinning by the State Sector Act may be sufficient for the 
Employment Court to consider there has been the exercise of a statutory power,55 
statutory underpinning by the ECA is not treated in the same fashion , especially 
when it involves private sector employers. This difference is most clearly in 
evidence in Davis v Ports of Auckland,56 a case concerning an application for 
interim relief following a decision by the employer to contract out work and 
consequently terminate staff. Redundancy notices had been issued based on a 
procedure contained in a registered but expired agreement which had been 
incorporated into individual contracts by section 19 of the Employment Contracts 
Act. Despite describing the case as being "hard to distinguish" from the School 
Inspectors case, Travis J nonetheless expressed sympathy to the employer argument 
that the matter involved the exercise of a contractual and not a statutory power. 57 
The issue of whether or not issuing notices of termination constituted a statutory 
power of decision was never finally determined. However , amongst the reasons 
why interim relief was declined was that the plaintiff' s case lacked real strength. 58 
A similar reluctance to find that there had been the exercise of a statutory power 
also arose in Hyndman v Air New Zealand. 59 The facts in this case are very similar 
to that in Ports of Auckland. Redundancy notices had been issued subsequent to a 
decision to contract out work. The procedure governing the redundancies was 
contained in an expired registered agreement, the provisions of which had been 
incorporated into individual contracts through the operation of section 19 of the 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
See, for example, Fahey v A-G [ 1993] 2 ERNZ 164; Tawhiwhirangi v A-G (1993] 2 ERNZ 
64; Clark v Housing Corporation Unreported, Employment Court, Wellington Registry , 
WEC 19/93 , 17 August 1993; Griffin and Teki v A-G (1995] 1 ERNZ 119; Armstrong v A-
G [1995] 1 ERNZ 43 ; Leslie v A-G Unreported, Employment Court, Wellington Registry , 
WEC 52/95 , 4 August 1995. 
(1991] 3 ERNZ 475. 
Above n 56, 482. 
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Employment Contracts Act. Although Colgan J acknowledged that the decision in 
the School Inspectors case provided the plaintiffs with a good argument for there 
being the exercise of statutory power, his decision seemed to suggest that he was 
not convinced. 60 The matter was not finally determined since interim relief was 
declined for other reasons. 
Both these judgments are inconsistent with the decision in the School Inspectors 
case, and they also stand in stark contrast to a later decision of the Court in Clark v 
Housing Corporation. 61 With the exception that Clark involved public 
employment, the facts of are similar to those in the Air New Zealand and Ports of 
Auckland cases. The power of decision arose under a registered but expired 
agreement which had been incorporated into an individual contract through the 
provisions of the ECA. Goddard CJ held that this constituted a statutory power of 
decision under the ECA , as well as under the State Sector and Labour Relations 
Acts. 62 
The Air New Zealand decision is also interesting because Colgan attempts to 
restrict the concept of statutory powers. The judge said that while the existence of a 
contractual relationship may not preclude judicial review , this was different from 
saying that there has been the exercise of a statutory power " merely because the 
Act governs aspects , albeit important ones , of that relationship. " 63 This sounds 
remarkably reminiscent of the requirement for there to be the exercise of a 
particular statutory power in the NZ Stock Exchange decision , despite Goddard CJ 
expressing the view in School Inspectors that it should be confined to its own facts. 
60 
61 
62 
63 
Above n 59, 844. Colgan J uses the phrase "if that it is" after referring to the alleged 
statutory power. 
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Colgan J then makes a distinction between a power recognised by statute and a 
power conferred by or under a statute, holding that powers arising either from 
contract or the common law are not reviewable even if they are statutorily 
recognised. There are real problems with this distinction. First, many of the 
powers under the State Sector Act, including powers acknowledged to be 
reviewable, would on this approach not be reviewable. The reason is that the 
Crown has a power under the common law to contract64 and therefore many 
provisions of the State Sector Act are only recognising existing powers at common 
law. Admittedly it is less clear that chief executives have an independent 
contractual capacity, 65 but it would not seem sound to suggest that the availability 
of judicial review would be contingent on this issue. 
The second problem with Colgan J's approach is that there appears to be no 
authority for it. Making such a distinction hardly seems in tune with the "broad, 
realistic and flexible" approach advocated by Woodhouse P and McMullin J in Re 
Erebus (No 2). 66 Arguably it is also inconsistent with the approach taken to the 
phrase "conferred by or under" in other Employment Court cases. In those cases , 
"conferred by" was held to mean created and "conferred under" was held to mean 
that the power was derivative, that it owed its existence to an activity authorised or 
underpinned by the Act. 67 Authorisation, used in this sense, includes the concept of 
sanctioning the use of a power. Recognition involves an acknowledgment of its 
legality. There is a difference between these concepts but it is small and it would 
not be in keeping with the spirit of the general approach to the JAA to exclude 
statutory recognition from the concept of statutory power. 
64 
65 
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Whether or not judicial review was appropriate in either the Ports of Auckland or 
Air New Zealand cases is not the issue here. What is being questioned is the 
method by which the appropriateness of judicial review was called into question. In 
both cases the judges sought to limit the concept of statutory power in a way that 
was inconsistent with the approach outlined in the School Inspectors case, a 
decision expressly followed in other cases involving state sector employers. The 
judicial gymnastics engaged in by the Employment Court over the concept of 
statutory power was almost inevitable since it was seen as an automatic trigger for 
judicial review. If the Court wished to exclude private employers from the scope of 
judicial review, as appeared to be their underlying motive in both the Air New 
Zealand and Ports of Auckland cases, a better basis to have done so was to argue 
there was no public element involved. Only if there is a public element is there a 
need to ask whether there had been an exercise of a statutory power. The answer to 
that question is of procedural importance alone. 
Using the presence of a public element as the touchstone for the availability of 
judicial review means that the Employment Court is free to take a more liberal 
approach to the concept of statutory power, without opening the jurisdiction to all 
employment disputes, public and private alike. Taking a broad view also makes it 
easier for the Court to achieve consistency in its approach. 
C Powers and Freedoms 
1 Powers and freedoms distinguished 
Another area of concern over the Employment Court's treatment of statutory 
powers is the distinction they make between powers and freedoms. The effect of 
this distinction is that many if not most decisions taken in respect of collective 
bargaining fall outside of the supervisory jurisdiction of the Court. 
25 
Rodney Harrison identifies two major categories of acts by an employer that are 
potentially reviewable under the ECA. 68 He characterises the first category as acts 
taken in reliance on the enabling regime introduced by the Act, in particular the 
negotiation of employment contracts. The second is described as relating to 
decisions taken pursuant to or at least as a consequence of the existence of an 
employment contract. Cited examples of acts in this second category include 
decisions to terminate employment, for reasons of redundancy or otherwise or to 
vary conditions. 69 The Employment Court has held that acts falling within the 
second category constitute a statutory power, albeit only in one instance a statutory 
power under the ECA. 70 The rest have involved powers under the State Sector Act. 
The Employment Court has never, however, believed that actions by employers 
falling into Harrison's first category could ever be subjected to judicial review 
under either Act. 
Their position was first made clear in the School Inspectors case. There the Court 
used as an example of the kind of decision that would not be subject to judicial 
review, the conduct of negotiations. The reason for this was that the conduct of 
negotiations involved purely contractual powers or freedoms which were not, they 
considered, reviewable. 71 
This matter was more fully discussed m Northern Local Government Officers 
Union v Auckland City. 72 In this case the old award governing the terms and 
conditions of employment of staff employed by the City Council had expired and 
no new agreement had been reached. Staff were consequently on individual 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
R Harrison "Judicial Review of Administrative Action: Some Recent Developments and 
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contracts of employment based on the provisions of the old award. The Council 
advertised several vacancies. Existing staff were told that the conditions attaching 
to the new positions would be different to what they were currently enjoying. 
Amongst other causes of action, the Union sought judicial review of the Council's 
decision. 
The Union argued that various of the sections m Part II of the Employment 
Contracts Act constituted a statutory power or statutory power of decision. They 
pointed to the objects section for Part II, section 9, which sets out the right to 
negotiate a collective contract and to be represented by a person or an organisation 
for that purpose. The Union also argued that section 18(1) empowered the parties 
to negotiate over the question of coverage by an individual or collective contract 
and that section 19(1) gave the right to enter into an individual contract where no 
collective contract was applicable. The Union also submitted that both the Long 
Title of the Act, which is expressly enabling, and the objects section for Part II 
clearly illustrated that the cluster of powers in question were conferred by or under 
the Act. 73 
The Employment Court disagreed. In a decision of the full bench, the Court said 
that while section 9 did confer a right, it was an absolute right to make an election 
between a collective and an individual employment contract. Similarly, section 18, 
entitled "Freedom to Negotiate", was just that, a freedom, not a reviewable power 
or right. And again, section 19(1) was described as empowering at the election of 
employers and employees. The Court said that nowhere amongst the provisions 
referred to were there any powers. 74 
73 
74 
Above n 17, 1134-1135. 
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27 
2 Is the distinction valid? 
Rodney Harrison questions the validity of the distinction made by the Court 
between a liberty or freedom established by the Act and a power or right conferred 
by it. He suggests that either Part II of the Act is enabling of employers or it is 
not. If it is, then what has been characterised as a freedom must necessarily be the 
exercise of a statutory power. 75 
In considering the nature of the right to negotiate, parallels can be drawn with the 
right to a job. As Ellis J said in Lambie v Poutasi,76 the right to a job is really 
more of an opportunity to gain a benefit. There is no real right to a job but there is 
a power to apply for it, and decisions taken in respect of that application might 
affect that power. 77 The same applies to the negotiation of an employment contract. 
There may not be a right to a collective contract (or any particular provisions 
within it) but there is an opportunity or power under the ECA to seek one. 
Decisions taken by public bodies in respect of that power should, in principle, be 
reviewable on public law grounds. It is hard to justify why decisions to appoint 
should be subject to review when decisions relating to the terms of that 
appointment are not. The degrees of empowerment and discretion would appear to 
be similar under each. 
Further inconsistencies arise from the distinction, in particular, that it treats powers 
of negotiation differently to other powers under the State Sector Act. The 
Employment Contracts Act is not the only source of statutory empowerment for 
collective bargaining. Statutory empowerment also arises under the State Sector 
Act. Section 7 of that Act states that the State Services Commissioner shall have all 
the powers necessary to carry out the functions and duties imposed on them. One 
75 
76 
77 
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of their express functions is to negotiate conditions of employment of employees in 
the public service. 78 The Commissioner is therefore directly empowered by the 
State Sector Act to negotiate conditions of employment. It makes no difference that 
this function is now generally delegated to chief executives, since this delegation is 
expressly authorised by the Act. 79 The high degree of statutory underpinning of 
collective bargaining in the state sector brings it squarely within the concept of 
statutory power as articulated by the Court in the School Inspectors case and 
subsequently. 
Holding decisions taken in respect of collective bargaining to be non-reviewable 
also creates inconsistencies over the treatment of the good employer principle in 
the context of statutory powers. When the State Sector Act was introduced , the 
Minister of Labour said that the good employer provision was introduced to make 
it clear that the State should continue its traditional function of setting a good and 
progressive example to private sector employers. 80 Part of this tradition, it is 
argued , includes a commitment to the concept of collective bargaining. 81 The 
requirement to be a good employer therefore incorporates a commitment to 
collective bargaining. Since in other circumstances the duties and obligations 
created by the good employer provision have been treated as giving rise to the 
exercise of a statutory power, 82 decisions taken in respect of collective bargaining 
should be similarly treated. 
78 
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3 Is unfettered freedom appropriate? 
There is another objection to statutory prov1s1ons relating to negotiations being 
classified as non-reviewable freedoms. While concepts of absolute freedom may be 
appropriate in a private law context, the whole purpose of administrative law is to 
ensure that public bodies act in accordance with the law. In the words of Sir 
William Wade: 83 
The powers of public authorities are .. . essentially different from those of private persons. 
A man making his will may, subject to any rights of his dependents, dispose of his 
property just as he may wish. He may act out of malice or a spirit of revenge, but in law 
this does not affect his exercise of his power. In the same way a private person has an 
absolute power to allow whom he likes to use his land, to release a debtor, or, where the 
law permits, to evict a tenant, regardless of his motives. This is unfettered discretion. But a 
public authority may do neither unless it acts reasonably and in good faith and upon lawful 
and relevant grounds of public interest. . . . The whole conception of unfettered discretion is 
inappropriate to a public authority, which possesses powers solely in order that it may use 
them for the public good. 
These views were echoed by the Privy Council in Mercury. Despite their seeming 
acknowledgment that the decision to terminate the contractual arrangements 
derived from contract and not statute, 84 the Privy Council nonetheless said that 
commercial decisions of State Owned Enterprises were reviewable. Their starting 
point was that judicial review was an invention by the courts to ensure that 
decisions made by the executive or public bodies were made according to the law, 
even if the decision was not otherwise actionable. 85 
83 
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D Statutory powers after Mercury 
The decision of the Privy Council in Mercury that a general empowerment by 
statute is sufficient to ground jurisdiction under the Judicature Amendment Act 
should force the Employment Court to rethink its approach, not least because the 
subject matter of that case, the termination of a contract following an inability to 
agree to new terms, bears a close similarity to the facts in both the Air New 
Zealand and Ports of Auckland cases. That said , the Court still needs a mechanism 
by which to immunise purely private law concerns from judicial review. The 
appropriate mechanism is to ask whether or not there has been the exercise of a 
public law power. 
Mercury also makes it clear that commercial decisions will not be immune from 
review. This too should make the Employment Court rethink its approach to the 
concept of non-reviewable freedoms. While commercial decisions should in 
principle be subject to judicial review, nonetheless the Privy Council makes it clear 
that there will be instances in which the Court should exercise restraint. 86 This is a 
matter which is discussed more fully in the next chapter. 
While it is possible to be critical of the approach of the Employment Court, 
deciding who is subject to judicial review and in respect of what is a question that 
has often taxed the minds of judges. No simple solution has been forthcoming. 
The public law element is in many ways as elusive as the holy grail. 
86 Above n 10, 529. 
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Ill THE SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
A Mercury: Does it Define the Scope? 
It is one thing to say that the key to the availability of judicial review is the 
exercise of a public law power; it is another thing to determine what constitutes a 
public law power in the employment arena, as the experience of the United 
Kingdom (UK) shows. Described as "unpredictable and controversial", 87 English 
courts have not found it easy to determine on what basis a public body is 
susceptible to judicial review m respect of its employment decisions. The 
underlying problem is that employment of staff is not an exclusively public 
activity. 
Before turning to consider the difficulties faced by the English courts in trying to 
determine an overriding test as to when judicial review of employment decisions 
will be appropriate, it must be asked whether the Privy Council decision in 
Mercury has made such a discussion redundant. Is Mercury authority for the 
proposition that all public bodies (including those established as companies) are 
susceptible to judicial review in respect of all their commercial decisions, 
including decisions relating to employment? This is one interpretation of Mercury. 
However it is also possible to take a more restrictive view. 88 
In Mercury the decision being challenged was the termination of an agreement for 
bulk electricity supply. As such, it was a matter which was at the centre of 
Electricorp's very existence. So too was the subject matter of the dispute in Napier 
87 
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107 LQR 298. 
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City Council v Health Care Hawkes Bay89 at the centre of the Crown Health 
Enterprise's reason for being. In this case the dispute concerned the decision of the 
Crown Health Enterprise to establish one regional hospital in Hastings and down 
grade services currently provided in Napier. That the matter "went to the heart of 
HCHB's undertaking" was an important consideration as to the availability of 
judicial review. 90 
On this interpretation, what makes a decision an appropriate matter for judicial 
review is the degree of correlation between the nature of the decision being 
challenged and the general activity of the body. The problem, then, with using 
judicial review to challenge employment decisions is that it is debateable whether 
or not a sufficient correlation exists. Employment of staff is often, and perhaps 
even usually , incidental to the main purpose of the body. Employment of staff is 
not even always necessary, as the increasing use of contract labour illustrates. 
John Fogarty QC has commented that the real lesson from Mercury is that the 
courts will look beyond name and form to function. 91 The fact that a body may be 
incorporated as a private company will make no difference to the availability of 
judicial review provided the nature of the activities undertaken are a proper subject 
for such review. This kind of approach is supported by Lord Woolf, who has 
suggested that even fully privatised companies such as British Telecom and British 
Gas may be subject to judicial review in respect of their duties to the public as a 
whole. 92 On this view, Mercury still leaves open the question of whether or not 
employment decisions are an appropriate subject for public law remedies. 
Interestingly, Lord Woolf generally thinks not, arguing that employment issues are 
essentially of a domestic and not a public nature . 93 
89 
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The scope of judicial review in employment is not an issue that has been directly or 
systematically tackled in New Zealand. Part of the reason for this is that the 
concept of statutory power has incorrectly been seen as largely determining that 
scope. Conversely , the scope of judicial review in employment has been examined 
in a number of key decisions and academic writings , particularly in the UK. An 
analysis of the issues grappled with by the English courts and commentators 
therefore provides a useful place to start looking at the scope of judicial review of 
employment related decisions in New Zealand. 
B Judicial Review in the UK: the Search for the Public Law 
Element 
I Employment by a public body 
In the UK, mere employment by a public body has never been sufficient to bring 
an action in judicial review. This was clear from the early employment cases such 
as Ridge v Baldwin which made distinctions between ordinary employees and those 
who were deemed to "hold office", such as chief constables. It was only the latter 
group who were entitled to public law remedies . The termination of an ordinary 
employment relationship only gave rise to remedies in contract. 94 
The streamlining of judicial review procedures which took place with the 
introduction of Order 53 of the Supreme Court Rules (the equivalent to our 
Judicature Amendment Act) was held to make no difference to that general 
proposition. Woolf J , as he was then , said in R v BBC ex parte Lavalle: 95 
94 
95 
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The prerogative remedies of mandamus, prohibition and ceniorari ... had not previously 
been available to enforce private rights and ... were not appropriate and in my view remain 
inappropriate remedies, for enforcing performance of ordinary obligations owed by a 
master to his servant. An application for judicial review has not, and should not be 
extended to a pure employment situation. 
2 Scope further defined 
Whilst the Courts were clear that disputes arising out of an employment contract 
did not give rise to a remedy in public law, the scope of judicial review was still 
far from settled. First, there was considerable debate over whether or not the 
employment of civil servants was contractual. 96 Secondly, even if there were a 
contract, it was common for employment in the public sector to also be partly 
governed by statute or regulation. 
(a) Statutory/contractual dichotomy 
The first attempt to "clarify" the availability of judicial review of employment 
related decisions arose in R v East Berkshire Health Authority ex parte Walsh. 97 
The issue in this case was whether statutory underpinning of contractual provisions 
was sufficient to give rise to a remedy in public law. The National Health Service 
(Remuneration and Conditions of Service) Regulations 1974 provided that 
negotiated conditions, other than remuneration, that received approval from the 
Secretary of State were to apply automatically to all employees. 98 In Walsh's case, 
the negotiated dismissal procedures had received such approval. Walsh argued that 
breaching these procedures, which were recognised by regulation, was an 
infringement of his rights protected by pub I ic law. 
96 
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The Divisional Court agreed but the decision was overturned on appeal. The Court 
of Appeal held that although the public law element could be injected by the 
existence of statutory provisions underpinning the employment relationship, the 
Regulations in this instance did not constitute such an underpinning. 99 According to 
Donaldson MR there were two ways in which Parliament could underpin the 
position of public employees. The first was by directly restricting the freedom of 
the authority to dismiss. 100 The second was by requiring the public authority to 
contract with its employees on specified terms. If the authority then failed to 
honour those terms, the employee acquired rights in private law. 101 Had the Health 
Authority failed to incorporate the dismissal procedure into Walsh's contract, he 
would have had an action in public law. However, since they had, his remedy was 
held to arise only in contract for a breach of those incorporated conditions. 102 
The decision in Walsh has not been without its critics. 103 Bernadette Walsh argues 
that the meaning given to "statutory underpinning" in Walsh is novel. She says 
there is no authority to support the view that the requisite statutory underpinning is 
absent if a public body is required to contract on specific terms with its staff. 104 
The case of R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Benwell105 
soon showed that the decision in Walsh did not provide a coherent basis for 
determining the scope of judicial review. With one major exception the facts in 
Benwell and Walsh were alike. The distinguishing feature was that Benwell, as a 
prison officer, was a Crown servant rather than a local authority employee. 
99 
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Because he was a Crown servant it was considered there was no contractual 
relationship and, therefore, the code was enforceable in public law. 106 
(b) Nature not source: the approach of Lord Woolf 
The Benwell case highlighted the practical problems with the Walsh test. But there 
were also more fundamental concerns. Courts were generally moving away from a 
consideration of the source of the power as a basis on which to ground judicial 
review, to a consideration of its nature. 107 In line with this trend, Woolf LJ 
attempted to further clarify and refine the scope of judicial review in the 
employment context. 
Underlying Lord Woolf's approach was the distinction between public and private 
law, an issue he had already discussed extra-judicially. 108 
I regard public law as being the system which enforces the proper performance by public 
bodies of the duties which they owe to the public. I regard private law as being the system 
which protects the private rights of private individuals or the private rights of public 
bodies. The critical distinction arises out of the fact that it is the public as a whole ... who 
are the beneficiaries of what is protected by public law and it is the individuals who are the 
beneficiaries of the protection provided by private law. 
This reasoning was applied in R v Derbyshire County Council ex parte Noble 10'\ a 
case involving the dismissal of a deputy police surgeon. Woolf LJ held that it was 
106 
107 
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not an appropriate subject for judicial review because the complaint referred to the 
way he and he alone was treated . 110 
His approach was further developed in McLaren v Home Offtce. 111 Here Lord 
Woolf said "[i]n relation to his personal claims against an employer, an employee 
of a public body is normally in exactly the same situation as other employees. " 112 It 
made no difference whether or not the employee was in a contractual relationship 
or whether or not they "held office". Whatever rights they had would usually be 
enforceable only by ordinary action. Judicial review was considered both 
unnecessary and inappropriate. 113 
While saying that judicial review would not normally be appropriate , Lord Woolf 
outlined in both Noble and McLaren circumstances when the subject matter meant 
it was. The first of these was initially discussed in Noble and referred to the kind of 
situation that arose in CCSU. According to Lord Woolf, judicial review was 
appropriate in CCSU because the case was not about the factual terms of 
employment of one particular officer , but was about a policy decision by the 
Minister which affected all employees. Its broad application was what made it 
appropriate for judicial review. 114 A further condition was added in McLaren. The 
employee must also contend that the decision which has this general application is 
flawed on Wednesbury grounds. 115 
The second major situation where Lord Woolf considered that judicial review 
would be appropriate was in relation to the operation of some disciplinary or other 
body established under statute or the prerogative, since the supervision of inferior 
tribunals had always been part of the public law role of the Courts. 116 The Civil 
110 Above n 109, 820. 
Il l [1990] ICR 824. 
112 Above n 111 , 836. 
113 Above n 111 , 836. 
114 
Above n 109, 819. 
115 Above n 111 , 837 . 
116 Above n 111 , 836. 
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Service Appeal Board was an example of such a body. 117 In contrast, informal 
tribunals or those of a wholly domestic nature were considered to be outside the 
ambit of judicial review. 118 
Woolf LJ's discussion of the Walsh case in Noble points to two further instances 
when judicial review may be available. The first was where there was an invalid 
delegation of power, 119 and the second where powers were used for improper 
purposes. 120 
Lord Woolf's approach has also come in for criticism, particularly from Sandra 
Fred man and Gillian Morris. Central to their criticism is that, to use their words: 121 
it assumes that public law elements are exceptional and separable in an essentially private 
law relationship. This is turn puts great emphasis on a clear-cut definition of 'public law'. 
Yet it is not clear what it is about the subject matter of a decision that makes it public. 
They are also critical because, as with the contractual/statutory dichotomy, the 
subject matter approach also leads to anomalous outcomes. The cases of R v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Attarcf22 and McLaren provide 
one such example. Both those cases arose out of an industrial dispute by prison 
officers involving suspension without pay. The situation in McLaren was held to be 
appropriate for a private law action whereas the very similar facts in Attard left the 
Court of Appeal in no doubt that it was a public law matter. 123 Fredman and 
Morris also point to anomalies between McLaren and CCSU. Why, they ask, were 
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changes to conditions of employment in CCSU a public law matter, but in McLaren 
a private law matter? 
The distinction made by Woolf LJ in relation to CCSU between decisions of 
general application and those affecting individuals was also criticised as arbitrary. 
How many individuals does it take to turn a private law issue into a public law 
one?124 
Lord Woolf has subsequently acknowledged the validity of these criticisms. 
Referring to his attempts in Noble and McLaren to try and clarify the boundary 
between public and private law he said: "I myself tried to draw attention to 
indicators which would penetrate the gloom but I do not suggest I have been 
wholly successful. " 125 He went on to say that any overriding test should have two 
primary requirements. To be suitable for public law it should be an issue about 
which the public has a legitimate concern as to its outcome and should be one 
which is not is already satisfactorily protected by private law. 126 
C English concerns and the New Zealand context 
The UK experience shows how difficult it is to formulate a precise basis on which 
to determine the scope of judicial review in employment that is both logical and 
coherent. That experience alone suggests that the Employment Court would be 
better to take a broader approach to the issue of public law powers. An analysis of 
the rationale underlying the approach of both the Court of Appeal in Walsh and 
Woolf LJ reinforces that view. 
124 
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1 Underlying concerns 
Bernadette Walsh contends that the test articulated in Walsh masks the real 
concerns motivating the decision. 121 The first of these concerns was the availability 
of an alternative remedy. The applicant had a remedy in the statutory unfair 
dismissal procedure which was clearly considered a more appropriate procedure in 
the circumstances. 128 The second was that it created the potential for there to be a 
large number of applicants. The Master of the Rolls actually said in his judgment 
that he was not sorry to have come to the conclusion he did because "a contrary 
conclusion would have enabled all national health service employees .. . to seek 
judicial review. " 129 In addition to stated concerns , Walsh argues that because the 
dispute in question was similar to one which might arise in the private sector , the 
Court believed the available remedies should be the same. 130 As can be seen from 
his decisions and extra-judicial writings, Woolf LJ shares these concerns , 
particularly those relating to the availability of alternative remedies and similarity 
with private law disputes. 131 
To the extent that the Employment Court has a concurrent jurisdiction in public 
and private law the availability of alternative remedies is not an issue which should 
influence the scope of judicial review in New Zealand. The concurrent jurisdiction 
means that causes of action can be pleaded simultaneously in both public and 
private law and will be heard by a court with specialist employment law expertise , 
a factor weighing particularly with May LJ in Walsh. 132 It also means that where 
the Court considers that private law remedies are more appropriate it can give 
effect to this in either (or both) of two main ways. The Court can exercise its 
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discretion not to give a remedy in public law where it considers a private law 
remedy more appropriate, or, it can award what might normally be regarded as 
private law remedies in public law proceedings, for example, by awarding 
damages. 133 
The "floodgates" argument is also more apparent than real in the New Zealand 
situation. The scope of employer actions able to be challenged under the personal 
grievance provisions of the ECA is far wider than that covered by the UK 
Employment Protection legislation which only provides a remedy for unfair 
dismissal. Not only can dismissals be challenged under the Employment Contracts 
Act but also unjustifiable action, discrimination, sexual harassment and duress on 
the grounds of union membership. 134 Therefore, while the public law cause of 
action may be open, the actual numbers utilising it instead of the cheaper and 
speedier personal grievance procedure would not be great. 
Concerns over the availability of alternative remedies and "floodgates" may be 
dealt with by demonstrating that they are far less problematic in the New Zealand 
context. The issue of whether or not public employment is fundamentally a private 
law issue cannot be explained away on the same basis. The same issues arise in 
New Zealand. One of the reasons for arguing that public law should be available to 
challenge employment decisions by public sector employers is that, despite the 
similarities between employment in the public and private sectors, there are also 
fundamental differences. 
2 Public employment and the State Sector Act 1988 
The State Sector Act 1988 is the main, but not the only piece of legislation relating 
to public sector employment. 135 When introduced it radically altered the nature of 
133 
134 
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employment in the state sector in two main ways. First, it changed the nature of 
employment. Instead of being employed in the public service generally, public 
servants are now employed by departmental chief executives. 136 Secondly it 
changed the nature of industrial relations. The Labour Relations Act 1987, which 
regulated industrial relations in the private sector was to also apply to the state. 
Although some differences remained, 137 for the first time public and private 
industrial relations operated under common rules. 
The passage of the ECA has seen these differences virtually disappear. The right to 
final offer arbitration has been repealed, 138 although arbitration still exists under 
separate legislation for workers in the police and defence forces. And, in line with 
the enterprise nature of bargaining under the ECA, the State Services 
Commissioner has delegated their negotiation function to departmental chief 
executives. 139 
Despite being brought under the same legislative framework, statutory differences 
remain between state and private sector employment. State sector employment is 
governed by statutory provisions not applying to the private sector. The obligation 
on chief executives to establish a process by which departmental employees can 
challenge appointments is one. 140 The obligation to operate a personnel policy that 
complies with the principle of being a good employer is another. 141 In addition to 
statutory differences, there are aspects of the state's role as employer which is 
136 
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fundamentally different than that of private sector employers, and which give 
public sector employment distinct characteristics. 
3 The diff ere nee between public and private employment 
Sandra Fredman and Gillian Morris argue that there are two related and immutable 
factors which mean that no matter how hard governments may try to replicate 
private sector industrial relations practices, state employment will always be 
unique. 142 The first is that the state has a dual role, that of government and 
employer. This not only means that an employer is accountable to Parliament but 
that it can, through legislation, endow its managerial decisions with the force of 
law. The second uniquely distinguishing factor is the source of revenue to employ 
staff and carry on operations. Unlike private employers whose source of revenue is 
profit based on the output of its staff, the state largely derives its income from 
taxation. The state, as employer, is therefore subject to political and 
macroeconomic constraints, rather than to market led considerations. 
There are numerous examples of governments in New Zealand legislating to give 
legal force to what, in the private sector, are managerial decisions. The first is in 
the area of coverage by individual or collective employment contracts. Despite the 
provision in the ECA permitting employees to choose between being covered by an 
individual or a collective employment contract, 143 this right to choose is overridden 
in the State Sector Act for members of the Senior Executive Service. 144 They are 
all on individual contracts. Similarly, in the middle of a dispute with the Post 
142 
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Primary Teachers Association in the 1989, the Government legislated to place 
secondary teachers on individual contracts. 145 
The Government can also use legislation to impose mandatory terms and conditions 
of employment into an employment contract, even though it is not a party to it, 
since individual departments and not the Government are the employer. There are 
many examples in the State Sector Act of statutorily imposed terms, covering 
things from the employment of casual workers to conditions for workers who are 
transferred. Another example of the imposition by law of standards is the right of 
the State Services Commissioner under section 57 of the State Sector Act to issue a 
code of conduct covering the minimum standards of integrity and conduct that are 
to apply to the public service as a whole. 146 Included in this code are provisions 
which impinge on a worker's freedom of expression, for example by limiting an 
individual employee's ability to comment politically on Government actions or 
openly support or criticise political parties. 147 A private sector employer would not 
be able to justify such political gagging. The Police also have limitations placed on 
their political activities. Section 31 of the Police Act 1958 states that no police 
officer shall take any part in any Parliamentary or local authority election, as a 
candidate or in any other manner, other than by voting. 
Differences also arise in the area of collective bargaining. While the rules applying 
to collective bargaining may be the same, the operation of them can be very 
different. With the exception of police and defence force staff, state workers might 
have the right to strike over the negotiation of their collective contracts. However, 
a strike of these workers is usually very different from a strike of workers in the 
private sector. Strikes in the public sector generally have political rather than 
145 
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economic effects since a strike by public sector workers invariably affects the user 
of their services , such as patients, pupils and ordinary members of the community. 
Striking workers look for sympathy to their cause from amongst the very groups 
who are affected by their actions. They aim to hurt their employers politically 
rather than economically. 
Another area of difference is over the conduct of industrial disputes and the 
resources open to state employers. This was clearly in evidence during the recent 
strike by prison officers. During the strike, the army and police were brought in to 
cover , an option in an industrial dispute not generally available to private 
employers.
148 
Moreover , the wages of defence force personnel employed in prisons 
during the strike were not even met by the Department of Corrections, the 
employer of the prison officers. 149 
Private sector employers are largely influenced by economic considerations in the 
conduct of an industrial dispute about wages and conditions. In the public sector, 
however, is hard if not impossible to separate the fiscal from the political. In the 
face of Government policies that seek to lower levels of public expenditure, even if 
the employer is willing, there is often no money with which to give staff a pay 
rise. 150 That pubic employees have to persuade the Government rather than their 
employers to give them a pay rise was clearly illustrated by lengthy industrial 
negotiations in the last two years over primary and secondary teachers pay. 
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Governments may also choose to ride out industrial disputes for political reasons. 
Private sector employers, on the other hand, are primarily motivated by pragmatic 
decisions based on the cost of the dispute versus the cost of the claim. 
It is not just over the level of wage rises that political considerations hold sway. 
The number of workers employed in public services is not determined by market-
led considerations as it would be in the private sector. The issue of what level and 
standard of service are provided is determined by political and macroeconomic 
factors. And finally, the authority for state employers to employ staff is itself 
sourced in legislation, a prerequisite not applying to the private sector. 
Referring to the decision by the Government in 1983 to introduce legislation to 
derecognise the Public Service Association (PSA) and seize its assets because of an 
industrial dispute, Jim Turner, Deputy General Secretary of the PSA said: 151 
there was a clear recognition - a convention if you like - that there was a difference 
between the public sector and the private sector. An employer who had the power to tax, to 
print money and to change the law was a peculiar sort of employer. Also there could only 
be one of them. Now that sort of employer is a different sort of employer, and their 
relationship with their employees is different from any other. 
Despite the passage of the State Sector Act, this comment remains true today. It 
may be that the concept of a career public service, in place since 1912, has now 
fundamentally changed, and it may be that the rules relating to state pay fixing 
arrangements have largely been brought under the private sector umbrella. 
However, this has not completely changed the nature of public employment. So 
long as the source of revenue for employment in the state sector comes from 
151 As quoted in P Walsh "The State Sector Act 1988" in Boston et al Reshaping the State 
(Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1991) 77. 
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taxation, so long as the employer can also legislate, and so long as the employer 
wants to win elections, public employment will never be just like that in the private 
sector. 
4 Judicial review and public employment 
The availability of judicial review does not just rely on there being differences 
between public and private employment, or that these differences are not always 
able to be separated. There is another reason which relates to one of the 
fundamental functions of judicial review itself, namely that the public have an 
interest and the courts have a role in ensuring that public authorities act within the 
law. The Divisional Court judge in Walsh articulated this argument well when he 
said: 152 
The public may have no interest in the relationship between servant and master in an 
'ordinary' case, but where the servant holds office in a great public service, the public is 
properly concerned to see that the authority employing him acts towards him lawfully and 
fairly. It is not a pure question of contract. The public is concerned that the nurses who 
serve the public should be treated lawfully and fairly by the public authority employing 
them. 
This traditional function of judicial review combined with the differences between 
public and private employment mean that the Employment Court should be 
encouraged to take a liberal approach to the question of what might constitute the 
exercise of a public law power in a core state sector employment context. The 
difficulties that the English Courts have had over formulating precise boundaries 
plus, the lack of problems arising in New Zealand over the issues of alternative 
remedies and floodgates must only confirm the Court in that approach. 
152 As referred to in the decision on appeal, above n 97, 162. 
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The same arguments support a broad approach being taken to the exercise of public 
law powers in an employment context by local authorities. In other employment 
situations, however, the distinction between public and private becomes more 
blurred. Take for example the position of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs). SOEs 
may be under a statutory obligation to be a "good employer" but this is the only 
statutory distinction between them and private sector employers that bears directly 
on employment. Nor can their position as an employer be described as unique. 
They have no power to legislate, derive their funding to employ staff from profit 
not taxation and, arguably like private employers, are motivated by economic 
rather than po! itical concerns. 
Whether or not judicial review should be available to challenge employment related 
decisions of SOEs is not an easy question to answer. The similarity in employment 
terms between the position of SOEs and private employers might be thought to be 
the critical consideration. If so, the decision in Mercury to subject SOEs to judicial 
review could be distinguished on the basis that employment decisions do not go to 
the heart of an SOE's activities. On the other hand, the fact that a SOE is a public 
body required to carry out its business in the interests of the public and with a 
statutory obligation to be a good employer may be considered a sufficient basis on 
which to ground judicial review, even though the public interest may not be an 
issue in decisions relating to individual employees. 
Another situation in which the availability of judicial review is far from clear cut is 
in a "contracting out" situation, for example the contracting out of cleaning or 
pathology services by a Crown Health Enterprise (CHE). For the purposes of this 
example, lets assume that the CHE, as a public funded body who is required to act 
in the public interest has been found to be susceptible to judicial review, including 
in respect of their employment decisions. If the availability of judicial review is 
based on the nature of the activity undertaken, does the fact that the work has been 
contracted out mean that judicial review is available in respect of decisions taken 
by a private contractor? 
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Less clear also is the position as relates to employers such as port companies. In 
1988 the Labour Government passed the Ports Companies Act. This Act required 
all Harbour Boards to set up registered companies whose principal objective is to 
operate as a successful business. 153 Being required to act as a good employer is not 
expressly part of this objective. Ports of Auckland is in fact a listed company, but 
the majority of shares are held by the Auckland Regional Authority. Does the fact 
that the Port Companies Act required the establishment of such companies affect 
the availability of judicial review? What effect does a majority shareholding by a 
local body have? 
These examples show that while it is possible to argue that a broad approach to the 
availability of judicial review should be taken in respect of employment in the core 
state sector and local authorities, the arguments supporting such an approach do not 
have the same force when applied to the public sector generally and are even less 
clear when applied to what may be described as the quasi-public sector. Two 
related issues underscore this lack of clarity: what is a public law element or 
function, and how does the public element test fit with the source of the power 
test?154 
The concept of a public element goes further than the public having an interest in 
the result. This was made clear by Simon Brown J in R v Chief Rabbi of the United 
Hebrew Congregations ex parte Wachmann, 155 who said that to attract the court's 
supervisory jurisdiction there must be not merely a public but potentially a 
governmental interest. This governmental interest was to be determined by 
whether, "but for" the existence of the body, the government would have moved to 
regulate the area over which the body had control. 156 
153 
154 
156 
Port Companies Act 1988 section 5. 
See for example: N Bamforth "The Scope of Judicial Review: Still Uncertain" f 1993) 239; 
D Pannick "Who is Subject to Judicial Review and In Respect of What?" (1992) PL 1. 
(1992] I WLR 1036. 
Above n 155, 1041-1042. 
50 
Despite the seemmg simplicity of this test, it does not shed much light on the 
question of the scope of judicial review of employment matters. It was made in the 
context of non-statutory bodies who nonetheless were regulating a significant area 
of public life. It does not say what constitutes a public element when the body is a 
statutory one. Nor does it deal with situations where, despite regulating an 
important area of public life, employment decisions are incidental to that function. 
What is clear from the Wachmann test is that it would be difficult to use as a basis 
for expanding judicial review of employment decisions to purely private 
employers. 
Lloyd LJ in his judgment in Datafin attempts to place the source of the power and 
the nature of the power tests in some kind of joint context. He said: 157 
I do not agree that the source of the power is the sole test whether a body is subject to 
judicial review ... Of course the source of the power will often, perhaps usually, be 
decisive. If the source of the power is a statute, or subordinate legislation under a statute, 
then clearly the body in question will be subject to judicial review. If, at the other end of 
the scale, the source of the power is contractual, as in the case of private arbitration, then 
clearly the arbitrator is not subject to judicial review. 
But in between these extremes there is an area in which it is helpful to look not just at the 
source of the power but at the nature of the power. If the body in question is exercising 
public law functions, or if the exercise of its functions have public law consequences, then 
that may ... be sufficient to bring the body within the reach of judicial review. 
The difficulties of applying the nature of the power test to employment related 
decisions make this approach of Lloyd LJ an attractive one to follow. It must of 
course be read subject to the decision of the Privy Council in Mercury where, it 
was held that the exercise of a contractual power did not per se oust judicial review 
if the body was generally empowered by statute. 158 Adopting such an approach 
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would arguably mean that all bodies required by statute to be good employers are 
subject to judicial review. For such bodies, this statutory underpinning is sufficient 
to injection a public law element into their employment related decisions. Left in 
the middle between public and private will be employers such as port companies or 
contractors for public services. Whether their employment related decisions will be 
reviewable might in the final analysis depend on a range of factors such as the 
nature of the business or activity and the nature of the decision in question. 
5 Judicial supervison and private law 
Given the similarity between public and private employment, does the availability 
of judicial review as a method of challenging employer decisions in the public 
sector but not in the private sector create an unfair anomaly? I suggest not. The 
first reason is the importance, in policy terms, of ensuring that public bodies act 
within the law and conform to proper standards. This consideration outweighs any 
unfairness to private sector workers. The second reason is that although private 
sector workers cannot bring an action in judicial review they can, in many 
circumstances, invoke public law principles in private law. The influence of public 
law on the law of employment can be seen most clearly in the law relating to 
dismissals under the personal grievance provisions of the Employment Contracts 
Act and its predecessors. 159 
In order to justify a dismissal an employer must be able to show that there were 
genuine reasons for the dismissal and that it was procedurally fair. In the words of 
Goddard CJ " ... a dismissal which is substantively justified will be vitiated if, in 
the process, the minimum standards of fair and reasonable dealing are ignored or 
neglected." 100 Procedural fairness requires that the worker be informed of the 
nature of the problem or the allegations of misconduct, that the worker is given an 
159 
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opportunity to comment and that their comments are given unbiased consideration, 
free from pre-determination and uninfluenced by irrelevant considerations. 161 
Fairness in employment law incorporates the two public law principles of natural 
justice: the right to be adequately informed and an opportunity to be heard, and the 
right to an unbiased hearing. 
With respect to the requirement for reasonableness, the approach here too is 
remarkably reminiscent of that adopted in administrative law. Cooke P said in BP 
Oil NZ Ltd v Northern Distribution Workers Union 162 "[t]he question is essentially 
what it was open to a reasonable and fair employer to do in the particular 
circumstances". 163 
If public law principles are applicable in private law to the conduct of parties to an 
employment contract, should the pre-contractual phase also be subject to the 
private law supervision of the court? After all, many of the reasons such as 
protection of the "right to work" which led courts, even at common law, to hold 
that public law principles should apply, 164 are equally applicable. Dawn Oliver 
argues private non-contractual supervision by the courts is an important and 
neglected area of the law. 165 She also suggests that the assumption that the pre-
contractual activities of public authorities cannot be reviewed is no longer justified 
in light of Datafin and the developments in private law supervision. 166 
The question of whether the Court can exercise a private law supervisory 
jurisdiction over pre-contractual matters takes on an added significance given the 
recent changes to labour relations in this country. For nearly one hundred years the 
regulation of the employment relationship was subject to significant controls 
161 
162 
163 
164 
165 
166 
Above n 160, 45-46. 
(1989) 3 NZLR 580. 
Above n 162, 582. 
See for example Breen v AEU [ 1971] 2 QB 175. 
D Oliver "ls ultra-vires the basis of judicial review?" [1987] PL 543,558. 
Above n 165, 561. 
53 
through the operation of legal support for trade unions and collective bargaining. 
These laws were designed to counteract the inequality in bargaining power inherent 
in the employment relationship. The legal supports were swept away by the 
Employment Contracts Act, which is largely premised on the exact opposite, that 
the parties to an employment contract are equal. 167 The lack of regulation over 
collective bargaining has had a devastating effect both on the wages, working 
conditions and consequent well-being of large numbers of workers, and on the long 
term viability of trade unions as institutions of social protection. 168 
Oliver contends that Courts, when exercising their supervisory jurisdiction, are 
increasingly concerned not just with issues of vires but also with the need to 
control an abuse of power. 169 There is no evidence of this trend in New Zealand 
employment law as the approach of the Court to the issue of harsh and oppressive 
conduct demonstrates. Section 57 of the ECA provides that a contract procured by 
harsh and oppressive behaviour can be set aside. The Court said this meant that if 
there was no contract there was no basis on which to intervene, even if the 
employer's behaviour was harsh and oppressive. 110 The introduction of a concept 
of "good faith" bargaining, as promised by several of the parties in the 1996 
General Election, might however create the impetus for a fresh approach and 
provide an opportunity for the import of public law principles into collective 
bargaining. 
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D The intensity of review 
While the employment decisions of many or even perhaps all public bodies should 
in principle susceptible to judicial review, there may nonetheless be occasions in 
which the Courts will nonetheless exercise restraint. John Fogarty QC has 
commented that the Privy Council decision in Mercury "clears the way for insisting 
on legal accountability of any body entrusted with a public function. " 171 He went 
on to say that "[a]t the same time it was important to appreciate the limits of legal 
accountability .... The common law will not adjudicate on the merits of any policy 
which is a lawful option. " 172 
The principles that permitted a court to interfere, including interfering in decisions 
relating to contracts were, according to the Privy Council in Mercury, set out in the 
"definitive judgment" of Lord Greene MR in Associated Provincial Picture House 
Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation. 173 This judgment has come to be associated with 
"unreasonableness" as a ground for judicial review. In fact, the decision also 
makes it clear that decisions are challengeable on various bases that would now be 
considered as falling under the general rubric of "illegality". 
While the Privy Council held that Electricorp was open to judicial review m 
respect of its commercial decisions, the actual application for review was declined. 
In so doing they said: 174 
171 
172 
173 
174 
(it] does not seem likely that a decision by a state enterprise to enter into or determine a 
commercial contract to supply goods or services will ever be the subject of judicial review 
in the absence of fraud, corruption or bad faith. 
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Michael Taggart argues that this obiter comment by Lord Templeman narrows 
considerably the "definitive" Wednesbury grounds earlier held to be the grounds 
on which judicial review would lie. This, Taggart claims, at best means there is 
still uncertainty around the scope of judicial review and at worst, renders the 
--i 
decision internally inconsistent and hollow. 175 ---
It is possible, however, to view Lord Templeman's comments as referring only to 
review on grounds of "unreasonableness" - that review on that ground will be 
unlikely in the absence of fraud or bad faith. If so, then the decision is not 
internally inconsistent. It is simply reflecting the reality that when making 
commercial decisions a wide range of options are open. Whether one option is 
better than another is not normally an appropriate subject for judicial review. This 
was the position of Lord Diplock in CCSU where he said that although he could 
see no a priori reason to rule out "irrationality" as a ground of review, decisions 
involving the application of government policy were unlikely to be open to attack 
on this ground. 176 
Other cases turning on decisions in which there have been a high policy content 
have been likewise decided. In R v Secretary of State for the Environment, ex parte 
Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council, 177 the decision by the 
Secretary of State to cap the community charge levied by the Hammersmith and 
Fulham Borough Council was challenged. Lord Bridge delivered the judgment of 
the House of Lords. He held that while the Court could intervene if the Secretary 
of State had acted illegally by, for example, taking into account irrelevant 
considerations, or acting for improper purposes, given that the case concerned the 
175 
176 
177 
Above n 41, 357. 
Above n 5, 951. 
[1991] 1 AC 521. 
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economic policy of the Government, the Court should be wary of intervening on 
grounds of irrationality in the absence of manifest absurdity or bad faith. 178 
If the Court changes its position and agrees that decisions relating to collective 
bargaining are in principle reviewable, it is nonetheless likely to be cautious in its 
approach. The size of wage offers is one area in which the Court is likely to 
exercise restraint. However, that does not mean that the Court never should or 
would intervene over the issue of wages. Since it is illegal to discriminate, a public 
employer should not be able to insist on the inclusion of discriminatory wage rates 
in an individual or collective contract. Other areas related to collective bargaining 
may also be open to challenge. If, for example, the good employer provision was 
held to incorporate a commitment to collective bargaining , which it is argued it 
does, then decisions related to the conduct of negotiations may also be able to be 
challenged on grounds of procedural impropriety. 
The Courts, when assessing whether or not to exercise restraint should bear in 
mind the comments of Richardson J, as he was then, in Telecom South Ltd v Post 
Office Union 179 where he said: "[t]he contract of employment cannot be equated 
with an ordinary commercial contract. It is a special relationship under which 
workers and employers have mutual obligations of trust, confidence and fair 
dealing. " 180 The underlying power imbalance inherent in an employment 
relationship and the consequences of a decision to an employee have been used to 
justify granting a remedy which otherwise would have been refused because of 
serious and inexcusable delay in bringing proceedings. 181 These kinds of concerns 
should also influence a court in deciding whether or not to exercise restraint. 
178 
179 
180 
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Carter v Attorney-General Unreported, 24 November 1994, Higb Coun, Wellington 
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IV CONCLUSION 
Goddard CJ said in Griffin that an application for review under section 105 of the 
ECA "involves a specialist adaptation of the principles of administrative law to 
employment law situations. " 182 In so far as section 105 requires administrative law 
principles to be applied in an employment context Goddard CJ is undoubtedly 
correct. Whether this involves an adaptation of the principles is open to question. 
In any respect, this paper suggests that the Employment Court has misunderstood 
the principles of administrative law rather than adapted them to the employment 
context. 
The fundamental flaw in the approach of the Employment Court is that they treat 
the exercise of a statutory power as the touchstone for the availability of judicial 
review. The inclusion of decisions taken by private companies within the definition 
of statutory power in the JAA has compounded this problem. The need to exclude 
private actions from the scope of judicial review has meant that the Court has not 
been able to take a logical or consistent approach to the concept of statutory power. 
The cases show that two main situations arise where the Court considers judicial 
review to be inappropriate. The first is in respect of employment decisions by 
private employers. The second is in respect of decisions relating to negotiations. 
The response of the Court in both areas is to attempt to narrow the definition of 
statutory power or narrow the circumstances in which a power is said to have been 
exercised. The paper suggests that a more appropriate and orthodox way of 
excludng purely private employers from the Court's public law jurisdiction would 
be to use the exercise of a pub I ic law power as the touchstone for judicial review. 
With respect to collective bargaining, the concept of judicial restraint rather than 
non-reviewable freedoms allows the high levels of discretion involved in the 
182 Above n 11, 140. 
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collective bargaining process to be acknowledged without suggesting that some 
activities of public bodies will be completely beyond the scrutiny of the courts. 
While it is possible to be critical of the approach taken by the Employment Court, 
the proper scope of judicial review of employment related decisions is not a 
straightforward issue. Underlying the difficulty are two issues. First, employment 
is not exclusively or even predominantly a public function and second, the changed 
nature of state means that public functions are carried out in private forms. Despite 
the complexity of the problem the Court is urged to take a robust approach to it. 
Statutory underpinning of employment decisions, including the obligation to be a 
good employer, should be sufficient to meet the public law requirement. 
Goddard CJ commented in Griffin that administrative law has been in a rapidly 
developing state over the past two decades. 183 The challenge for the Employment 
Court is to keep better abreast of those developments. But it is not just the 
approach to the jurisdiction that needs to change. The scope of jurisdiction 
conferred on the Court is itself inadequate. It needs to be extended to cover all 
employment related decisions. 
183 Above n 11, 141. 
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